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ABSTRACT 
 
Growth models which imply a scale effect are commonly refuted on the 
basis of empirical evidence. A focus on the extent of the market as opposed 
to the scale of the country has led recent studies to reconsider the role that 
country scale plays when conditioning on other factors. We consider a 
variant of a simple learning by doing model to account for the potential 
role for institutions in determining the strength – and direction – of the 
scale effect. Using cross-country data, we find a significant interaction 
between property rights institutions and the effect of scale on long-run 
growth: In countries with poor property rights institutions, scale is 
positively related with income per capita; where property rights institutions 
are good, higher scale is associated with lower per capita incomes. We find 
no evidence of such role for contracting institutions.  
JEL Classification: O11, O40, O43. 
Keywords: Scale and growth, learning by doing, institutions. 
 
 
1 Introduction
An implication of early models of endogenous growth such as Romer (1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) is that the scale of the
economy – the size of the research sector or the population of the country – should
be related positively with level of economic growth. Such scale effects are also a im-
plication of models based on learning by doing following Arrow (1962) and Romer
(1986) in which technology spillovers in larger economies generate faster growth.
A number of doubts about the empirical validity of the scale implication have
been raised. Lucas (1993) contrasted the growth records of Singapore and India in
suggesting that it was an unwelcome implication. A series of influential econometric
results found little evidence of a link between scale and growth: Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) employed data from a cross section of countries; Backus et al. (1992)
used industry level data; and, Jones (1995b) made the argument in the context
of trends over time within countries. Motivated by such empirical evidence, there
emerged theories, for example Jones (1995a), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Young
(1998), which could generate endogenous growth without an implied relationship
between scale and growth.1
Those models succeed in their purpose of removing the implication that greater
scale means higher long-run growth. The relevance of some of the empirical evi-
dence, especially that based on cross-country analysis, has been questioned, how-
ever. In particular, the conception of scale as country or sector aggregates misses
parts of what determines the extent of the market for a given firm or industry. As
1Some of these models – the ‘semi-endogenous’ models such as Jones (1995a) – relocate the
scale problem to an implied relationship between the rate of growth of population and the rate
of growth of the economy. By contrast, ‘Schumpeterian’ models of product proliferation and
endogenous growth, such as Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) and Aghion and Howitt (1998),
have no scale implication and no reliance on population growth. Ha and Howitt (2007) have
demonstrated that the Schumpeterian models perform better than semi-endogenous alternatives
when considered against data. The focus in this paper is on whether the implications of the
first-generation endogenous growth models can be reconciled with evidence on scale when we take
into account variations in institutional quality.
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Sokoloff (1988) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) find, the extent of the market, or its
density, is the conception of scale relevant to pace of technological progress. Indeed,
as Davis (2008) points out, Singapore is arguably part of a much larger international
economy, while India does not attain markets as large as country-level measures of
its scale would suggest. Motivated in part by a focus on market extent, Alesina
et al. (2000) have shown that conditioning on measures of openness can mean that
a significant role for country scale can exist in explanations of differences in growth
across countries.
Given the potential role for institutions in determining market extent, the focus
of this paper is on an interaction between institutions and the scale effect. There
is a substantial body of evidence that institutions matter directly for economic de-
velopment.2 The current paper then asks whether institutions matter indirectly :
Is the appearance of a scale effect conditional on institutional quality? There are
a number of potential mechanisms at work. For example, a higher risk of expro-
priation of international investment might make the scale of the internal market
a more important growth-determinant. It might be that improving the ability to
write enforceable contracts can mean that larger domestic markets can be formed in
countries that have greater scale, while those gains are not realised in smaller coun-
tries. Poor internal governance might depress development more in larger countries
because the scale of rents is greater.
In order to frame our empirical approach, we consider a simple model of growth
based on learning by doing and spillovers, presenting in an Appendix a variant of
the basic growth model in which the extent of the market determines the reach
of the spillovers. Using data for 180 countries over the period 1985–2004, we test
whether there are significant interactions between the quality of institutions and
the importance of country scale in explaining development. We characterize in-
2See also Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik
et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) for evidence on the role that insitutions can play
in explaining economic development.
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stitutions, following North (1981) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), into two
categories: ‘Contracting institutions’ affect the costliness of transacting and the
costs of forming contracts; ‘property rights institutions’, in contrast, reflect the
security of private property and the risk of expropriation by an elite. We test for
interactions using five different measures of each type of institutional quality (in-
cluding all those in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)) and proxy for scale using both
country population and the level of real GDP. We proxy for growth using both the
average growth in real GDP per capita over the period and the level of real GDP
per capita.
On the basis of these estimates, we find a consistently significant interaction
between property rights institutions and the log of income per capita: In countries
with poor property rights institutions, scale is positively related with the level of
development; where property rights institutions are good, greater scale is associated
with lower development. Without conditioning on institutional quality, scale does
not appear to be related significantly with development. By including an interaction
between institutions and scale we can see part of the explanation for why: On
average, scale does not appear to matter because the opposing forces from different
quality institutions can cancel each other out. We find no evidence of such a role for
contracting institutions and no connection with growth averaged over the sample
period.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the ways in which in-
stitutions and the scale effect might interact and presents a modified learning by
doing model with market extent to account for the potential role for institutions.
Section 3 introduces the measures of institutional quality that we use, presents
descriptive statistics, and discusses the main empirical results. Section 4 contains
some concluding remarks.
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2 Institutions and Scale
A useful way to think about different institutions and their affect on economic out-
comes is to follow North (1981) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in characterizing
two broad classes of institutions: First, ‘contracting institutions’ are those which
affect the costliness of transacting and the costs of forming contracts; ‘property
rights institutions’, in contrast, reflect the security of private property and the risk
of expropriation by an elite. Using various proxies for each institution, Acemoglu
and Johnson find evidence that property rights institutions can robustly be related
to economic outcomes such as the level of income per capita, while contracting
institutions generally cannot.
There are two potential ways in which institutional quality in a country can
interact with market extent. First, they can directly affect the extent of the market;
second, they can make the scale of the country a more or less important determinant
of market extent. Our intention in this Section is to lay out the channels through
which institutional quality could impact scale and growth and proceed in Section
3 to test for them in the data.
Direct Effects of Institutions
The direct effects contracting institutions are intuitive, and follow the arguments
of Coase (1960), Williamson (2000) and Fafchamps (2004), that poor contracting
institutions and high transactions costs limit the ability to diversify against risks,
to form large markets and to choose optimal organizational structures. A small
country with good contracting institutions has firms that might trade more widely
than a larger country with worse institutions. We can think of property rights in a
similar way. De Soto (2001), among others, has argued that weak property rights
institutions can impact on the ability to obtain scale, while Dollar and Kraay
(2003) have drawn attention to the correlation between international trade and
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institutional quality. Firms might look to minimise the exposure of their profits to
expropriation by forming closer markets based on social capital; international trade
can be hampered because of the possibility of asset seizures. As property rights
institutions improve, impersonal exchange grows and the belief in security of owned
assets means that international and domestic trade can expand.
Interactions with Country Scale
High quality contracting institutions in a country can benefit competition in in-
ternational markets, to the point that country scale, per se, matters less as a de-
terminant of market extent. When contracting institutions are poor, from this
perspective, country scale becomes a more important determinant of market extent
as international markets are less accessible. In contrast, when contracting institu-
tions are good, it may be that country scale can matter more if firms prefer to trade
with other firms that enjoy a similar (domestic) quality of contracting institution.
The costs of supporting institutions over a large scale can be significant, as
Alesina et al. (2005) and Davis (2008) have noted. As such, high quality con-
tracting institutions may mean that greater scale reduces growth. Suppose that
the proportionate costs of contracting institutions are increasing in the size of the
economy (as found by Wallis and North (1986)). It may be then that the costs
of supporting high quality contracting institutions in a country with larger scale
outweigh the learning by doing gains associated with the larger markets. That is,
good quality institutions may reverse the effect of scale on growth.
An interaction between the importance of scale and property rights institutions
can also be hypothesized. Poor property rights institutions might mean that larger
country scale can damage growth since the scale of the economy can increase in-
centives for the elite to exploit poor property rights and extract rents. Scale and
property rights institutions can interact in other ways, as Rock and Bonnett (2004)
have found in the context of the East Asian paradox. They show that various
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measures of corruption are positively related to growth in large countries, and neg-
atively related in smaller countries. They argue that a larger internal market can
increase the gains from ignoring corrupt institutions and increase the probability of
getting away with being corrupt. Governing a large country under a secure property
rights system can also be costly, perhaps to the point that increasing scale brings
demands upon the institution that lead to lower growth in a similar way to that
discussed in the context of contracting institutions. The multi-dimensional hetero-
geneity of large countries, discussed in Alesina et al. (2005), potentially reinforces
the costliness of good property rights institutions.
2.1 Learning By Doing, Institutions and the Scale Effect
We wish to capture the two ways in which institutions might impact on growth
via market extent: The direct effect of institutions on market extent and the affect
of institutions on the importance of country scale. Consider a country n with
institutional quality zn, where a higher zn implies better institutions. In order to
consider the importance of country scale in the context of a larger global market,
we need to think of a country’s proportionate scale. So let us define Sn ∈ (0, 1)
as country n’s scale as a proportion of world scale.3 Our question then is how
important is country n’s relative size for country n’s growth, and does conditioning
on the quality of institutions affect the appearance of a scale effect.4
Appendix A generalizes a simple learning by doing model of growth to consider
the extent of the market instead of country scale. Specifically, suppose that the Φn
3Just as the theory in Alesina et al. (2005) takes country size relative to the world. With a
scale effect based on absolute size, market extent in country n is, for example, φ · (Ln)s where s is
the parameter which captures the importance of country scale. When s = 0 clearly market extent
is φ. Where Ln > 1, market extent is larger for any s > 0. So growth is increasing in s always.
However, we would like s to capture the importance of a country’s scale for its growth rate; it
may be that when country scale matters less, growth is higher since the economy can be part of a
larger market than its population suggests. Using proportionate scale, Sn ∈ (0, 1), permits us to
think of the scale effect as capturing the importance of the size of the country for growth: When
s = 0, country scale does not matter for growth; when s = 1, country scale matters a lot.
4Our empirical results are based on purely cross-sectional data, so thinking of the relationship
between relative size and growth is the same as thinking of that between absolute size and growth.
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denotes the scale of the market for a firm in country n relative to the size of country
n. The learning by doing scale which determines growth is then not just the scale
of the country but also Φn; the extent of the market is (ΦS)n. A Cobb-Douglas
production function and CES preferences result in growth rates being equal to,
γn = θ
−1 [A0[(ΦS)n]1−α − ρ] (1)
where θ is the constant elasticity of substitution of consumption across time, ρ the
rate of time preference, α the share of capital in output and A0 a scaling parameter
in the production function.
Growth can differ between countries with identical scale if their Φ differs. This
measure of market extent has a natural interpretation. When Φ is greater than
one, it means that on average the economy has a market extent equivalent to a
measure of openness greater than one. The benefit of conceiving of Φ as separate
from openness is that when Φ is less than one, it captures a measure of average
non-integration of the domestic market; even though there may be some level of
interaction with international markets, on average, the market extent for a given
firm is smaller than the size of the domestic economy.
Suppose that market extent is related to zn both directly and via interaction
with country scale. We can write,
(ΦS)n = φ(zn)(Sn)
s+δ(zn), (2)
φ(zn) reflects the direct effect (with φ
′ ≥ 0) and δ(zn) captures the affect of insti-
tutions on the importance of country scale. We do not know the sign of δ′. When
zn = 0 the scale effect works through the autonomous effect of country size, s, on
market extent.
Better institutions, zn higher, can make country size more or less important,
depending on the sign of δ′. If δ′ > 0 (< 0) then better institutions make country
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scale a more (less) important determinant of market extent. If s+ δ(zn) > 0 then a
normal scale effect is present. Clearly, institutions can make scale bad for growth if
δ′ < 0 and s+ δ(zn) < 0. The typical approach to the scale effect tests for whether
s = 0, but without conditioning on institutions this is equivalent to testing that on
average, s+ δ(zn) = 0.
The relationship between (ΦS)n and zn (and so that between growth and zn)
clearly depends on the functions φ(zn) and δ(zn),
∂(ΦS)n
∂zn
= (Sn)
s+δ(zn) [φ′(zn) + φ(zn)δ′(zn) ln(Sn)] . (3)
If better institutions make country scale more important (δ′ > 0), then the effect of
improving institutions can be to reduce market extent if the country is sufficiently
small (i.e., if ln(Sn) is sufficiently negative relative to the gain from φ
′(·)). Where
better institutions make country scale less important (δ′ < 0), they will always
increase market extent. Using equation (2) and (1),
γn = θ
−1
{
A0α
[
φ(zn)(Sn)
s+δ(zn)
]1−α − ρ} . (4)
So institutions can affect growth in two ways. First, by directly expanding market
size they increase growth through greater learning by doing. Second, by affecting
the importance of country scale in determining market extent they affect the im-
portance of country scale in determining growth. The effect of scale on growth
can be higher or lower – or even negative – when institutions are good. These two
effects, one independent of scale and one interacting with scale, can be tested for
in the data, as we will see below.
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3 Empirical Evidence on Institutions and the Scale
Effect
The two channels by which institutions might affect market extent and growth can
be tested for using appropriate data. Our empirical evidence is based on permuta-
tions of two proxies for scale (log population and log real GDP) and two proxies for
growth (log real GDP per capita and average growth in real GDP per capita). All
scale and growth data are from Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006). We use five
proxies for each type of institutional quality, including all those used by Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005). Results in this Section are based on all forty permutations
of scale, growth and institutional variable, and for the same forty with additional
control variables, all of which are presented in the Appendix.
3.1 Institutional Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 gives a breakdown of the institutional variables we employ. The median
populations in the sample of 180 countries are Hong Kong and Tajikistan at 5.8
and 6.3 million, respectively. For the purposes of this table, we split the sample
into countries with greater and less than 6 million people.
A detailed breakdown of data sources and variable definitions is given in the
Appendix. The five rows below the growth variables are proxies for property rights
institutions. Executive constraint is a measure of constraint on executive power
using data from Polity IV (2006), on a scale between 1 (unlimited authority) and 7
(full accountability/subordination of the executive). The private property variable
from Gwartney and Lawson (1997) is a score indicating the extent of protection of
private property from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). We also use data employed
in Knack and Keefer (1995) from the International Country Risk Guide. First,
expropriation protection reflects the risk of expropriation of private foreign invest-
ments, between 0 (highest risk) and 10 (lowest risk). Second, repudiation measures
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(between 0 and 10) the risk of modification of a contract (by full repudiation, post-
ponement or scaling down) due to government pressure. The measure of corruption
is from La Porta et al. (1999), and scores from 0 to 10 the level of corruption in
government. Each of these proxies are direct measures of institutional quality, so
should be positively correlated with economic outcomes.
The final five rows are contracting institutions proxies. A measure of legal
formalism from Djankov et al. (2003) indicates the formality of legal procedures
for collecting on a bounced cheque, measured from 1 (low formalism) to 7 (high).
Two variables from the World Bank (2004) Doing Business studies are the number
of procedures and the procedural complexity (scored from 0 to 10) involved in
collecting a commercial debt of 50% of per capita income. We use two variables from
the recent work of Djankov et al. (2008). They survey lawmakers in regard to the
likely course for a hypothetical case where a company defaults on its single creditor
due to a temporary liquidity problem. The debt efficiency variable reflects the
present value of the net worth of company as a proportion of its total worth, while
debt cost is the estimated cost of the insolvency proceeding, again as a proportion.
All the contracting variables (except debt efficiency) are measures of institutional
badness, so should be inversely related with economic outcomes.
As can be seen from Table 1, there are no significant differences in institutional
quality across countries of different scale. Across all five proxies, property rights
institutions appear to be, on average, slightly worse in large countries. Proxies for
contracting institutions are less consistent. Four of the five proxies suggest that
contracting institutions are worse in large countries but, again, the differences are
small.5
5Bivariate regressions of institutional proxies on the log of population confirm the insignificance
of scale in explaining the quality of institutions. Of the ten proxies, only property security and
the number of procedures are significantly correlated with log population.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Whole sample Pop > 6m Pop < 6m
n avg s.d. n avg s.d. n avg s.d.
Growth rate 180 1.58 2.30 90 1.44 1.95 90 1.71 2.60
log(GDP per capita) 180 8.46 1.14 90 8.32 1.16 90 8.61 1.10
Exec. constraint 149 4.42 2.07 87 4.33 2.02 62 4.55 2.15
Prop. security 130 3.35 1.17 81 3.20 1.20 49 3.61 1.10
Expr. protection 116 7.12 1.82 78 7.02 1.88 38 7.35 1.69
Repudiation 87 6.70 1.97 58 6.59 2.04 29 6.93 1.85
Corruption 121 5.67 1.49 78 5.62 1.41 43 5.77 1.65
Formalism 111 3.67 1.07 71 3.72 1.04 40 3.59 1.12
Procedures 122 26.92 26.92 82 24.65 10.25 40 31.58 14.15
Complexity 121 5.78 1.39 82 5.80 1.39 39 5.73 1.42
Debt Efficiency 85 52.97 25.16 53 51.96 26.42 32 54.65 23.24
Debt Cost 85 0.13 0.10 53 0.14 0.10 32 0.12 0.09
N.B. Variable descriptions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13).
3.2 Empirical Strategy and OLS Results
Our purpose is to take cross country data to the potential interactions between
institutions, scale and growth captured in equation (4). Suppose that φ(zc) = φˆ · zc
and δ(zc) = δˆ · zc where φˆ and δˆ are constants. Then we can estimate a growth
regression of a form similar to those on interactions between openness and scale in
Alesina et al. (2000),
ln(γn) = β0 + β1 ln(Sn) + β2 ln(zn) + β3zn · ln(Sn) (5)
This functional form follows from the form of the growth equation, (4). The esti-
mates of β1 and β2 will tell us whether there is a growth effect from the country
scale and institutional variable, respectively. The coefficient β3 will reflect the in-
teraction between institutions and the scale effect, and whether it is significantly
positive or negative.
There is a potential identification problem in that institutions can both de-
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termine and be determined by the left-hand side variable. Natural historical in-
struments for each type of institutional variable are available (see Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005)) but the inclusion of an interaction term means that the first-stage
regressions in a 2SLS regression suffer from severe multicollinearity, making infer-
ence at the second stage difficult.6 A potential strategy to combat such problems
is dynamic panel estimation with lags of variables as instruments as in Dollar and
Kraay (2003) and Bhattacharyya (2009). Again, the presence of the interaction
term means that this approach is affected by significant multicollinearity between
the explanatory variables.
A number of studies, such as Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), have shown that
when instrumenting appropriately a robust role for institutional quality (partic-
ularly proxies for property rights institutions) remains. Dollar and Kraay (2003)
and Bhattacharyya (2009) have shown that a robust role for institutions exists even
when conditioning on trade and human capital, respectively. We proceed with OLS
results, therefore, with the proviso that our estimates will likely be upper bounds
on the significance of the institutional variables. As we will see, the results are con-
sistent enough across all forty permutations of institutional and economic proxies
(and forty more permutations again with control variables) that we can make some
confident inferences about the role of institutions in the scale effect.
Tables 3–12 report OLS results for all ten institutional proxies. The two different
dependent variables are average growth in real GDP per capita and the logarithm
of the level of real GDP per capita. The two proxies for country scale are the
logarithm of country population as a proportion of the world population and, the
6That is, including the instrument plus an interaction between the instrument and scale causes
multicollinearity in the first stage regression, making all standard errors in the second stage large.
As such, using the Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) methodology and data on the sample of former
colonies, we find that coefficient estimates on for all scale, institutions and interaction terms have
low t-statistics regardless of the proxy for scale or the measure of growth. Alesina et al. (2000)
are able to estimate 2SLS results using instruments for openness that do not appear to cause
inference problems, probably because the instruments they use for openness are dummy variables
with many zeros.
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logarithm of real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP as the proxies for country
scale. All data are averages over the period 1985-2004.
A clear pattern emerges from the regressions: When log GDP per capita is the
dependent variable, there exists a consistently significant interaction between the
quality of property rights institutions and country scale. The interaction between
property rights institutions and the scale variable is always negative and is highly
significant in nine of the ten baseline permutations; in seven of those nine cases,
there is a highly significant and positive role for scale independent of institutions
in explaining long-run growth. In other words, country scale is positively related
with growth, but less strongly so (and perhaps negatively) when property rights
institutions are good (we draw out the quantitative implications below). No such
role exists for contracting institutions (except for the measure of debt efficiency),
and there is little significance of either type of institution in explaining variations
in measures of average growth (except the measure of property security).
That is, when property rights institutions are of higher quality, country size is
a less important part of what explains growth over the long-run, and not over the
short run. When property rights institutions are poor, the country size plays a
significant part in constraining growth. That contemporaneous measures of eco-
nomic growth are not characterized by this interaction suggests that the effects of
property rights institutions on the scale effect appear only over the long-run. That
contracting institutions do not in general play a significant explanatory role sup-
ports the findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); it may be that inadequacies in
the quality of contracting institutions do not affect economic outcomes because op-
timizing individuals can compensate by changing the way they form contracts, and
so on. In contrast, the economic consequences of the property rights institutions
are, by their nature, harder to avoid by individual changes of behaviour.
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Robustness of the Results
In order to check the robustness of the baseline results, we present in Tables 3–12
OLS estimates when we condition on a number of other variables. Given that many
of the institutional measures we consider are related to the quality of government,
we condition on the level of government spending as a proportion of GDP.7 We also
condition on openness and the exchange rate in order to ensure that the effect of
institutions and their interaction with scale is not simply picking up the importance
of openness found in Alesina et al. (2000) and Alcala´ and Ciccone (2003). As can
be seen from the Tables, these additional variables do not affect the key results
noted from the baseline regressions.
To save space, we do not report a number of other robustness checks. Including
an interaction between openness and scale in addition to openness, as in Alesina
et al. (2000), has little effect on the reported results. Additional controls not
reported include the measure of exchange rate overvaluation from Acemoglu et al.
(2003) as an alternative to the exchange rate data used, the level of investment as
a proportion of output, and including initial income per capita in the regressions
with economic growth as the dependent variable. None of these additional controls
substantially affect our results. Using GDP per capita in a single year (such as
1995, as in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)), instead of an average over 1985–2004,
or using a longer average for all data (such as 1975–2004), does not affect results.
The significance of the interaction between institutions and scale is affected by
conditioning on measures of financial depth from Beck et al. (2000) and educational
data from, for example, Barro and Lee (1996). Including these additional variables
reduces the sample size significantly, and their impact on estimates of institutional
variables can also be due to multicollinearity; Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) do
not condition on human capital variables for similar reasons.8 As noted above,
7See, for example, Alesina et al. (2002), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), for empirical studies
of the relationship between government spending and growth.
8Consider the baseline GDP per capita regression from Table 3 that takes executive constraint
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work such as Bhattacharyya (2009) has shown that the institutions and measures
of human capital are both robust determinants of growth when one instruments in
a dynamic panel setting, and so supports the general implications of Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) that property rights institutions are a fundamental determinant of
long-run growth. In the absence of results based on instrumental variable estimates,
we must take the OLS results as upper bounds on the actual explanatory power of
institutions and their interaction with scale.
Quantitative Implications and Interpretations
The negative coefficient on the interaction term between institutional quality and
scale leaves the possibility that good institutions can make greater scale detrimental
to long-run growth, i.e., when s + δ(zn) < 0 in equation (2). For an idea of the
implications of the interaction on the scale effect, consider one of the baseline results
in Table 5, which regresses log per capita income on average protection against
expropriation, the log of population and an interaction between them. Table 2
gives the implications for the log level of GDP per capita of different levels of
scale and institutional quality.9 Consider three possible levels of population: 2m,
6m and 20m; and, three levels of the institutional quality: 5.5, 7 and 8. These
hypothetical values correspond approximately to the quartile values of population
and expropriation protection.10
Better property rights institutions are related with higher per capita incomes,
regardless of the scale of the country. The direction of the scale effect is dependent
as institutional proxy and population as the scale variable; the sample comprises 149 countries.
When we include the credit to GDP ratio from Beck et al. (2000) and the 1980–90 average of
spending on primary level schooling Barro and Lee (1996) the sample becomes 55 countries. In
that regression, the coefficient on credit is significant and positive, while those on schooling, scale,
institutions and their interaction with scale are insignificant even at 10%. Education spending is
significant when we include it without the credit to GDP variable.
9Since average expropriation is insignificant on its own, it does not enter independently into
the calculations of Table 2 (though doing so makes no difference to the qualitative implications).
10Numbers calculated in the table include the intercept, 7.61, which was unreported in Table 5.
The variable used for scale is population as a fraction of the world population. Reported numbers
are implied levels of real GDP per capita.
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Table 2: Scale, Institutions and Income Per Capita
Scale
2m 6m 20m
Inst.
5.5 1529 1589 1657
7 3517 3256 2993
8 6127 5254 4439
on the level of institutional quality, however. Without conditioning on institutional
quality, scale does not appear to be related significantly with long-run growth.
By including an interaction between institutions and scale we can see part of the
explanation for why: Where good property rights institutions exist, larger countries
are characterized by lower per capita incomes; in contrast, countries with poorer
property rights seem to do better when they are large. On the average, scale does
not appear to matter because these opposing forces cancel out.
One interpretation may be that countries with poor property rights institutions
rely more heavily on their internal scale because the potential for international
trade and foreign investment is limited. The scale of the country is then a far more
important determinant of market extent, and so growth. At the same time, and
as pointed out by Rock and Bonnett (2004), a country with poor property rights
institutions is better placed to engage with the international economy if it is larger:
A small country with poor property rights institutions can be subjected more easily
to sanctions and trade restrictions; at the same time, the potential gains to outsiders
of engagement with larger countries means that issues of poor governance may be
more likely to be overlooked. That this does not appear to happen in the quality
of contracting institutions supports the findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
that impediments resulting from poor contracting institutions can be obviated by
private agents. The risk of losing an entire contract to government expropriation,
on the other hand, cannot.
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The finding that greater scale can be associated with lower levels of GDP per
capita is harder to interpret. The costs of supporting property rights institutions
of a given quality may play a role through its impact on government spending
and taxation. A large country with a very secure property rights system might
have to allocate a greater proportion of its wealth to maintaining that institution,
perhaps to the point that increasing scale brings demands upon the institution that
lead to lower incomes. In other words, the costs of institutional quality of a given
level increase disproportionately with country size as more is put into maintaining
institutions over a more diverse geographic, demographic and political spectrum.
This suggests that the costs of size noted by, among others, Alesina et al. (2005)
and Davis (2008), can indeed be significant.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have found evidence of a role for property rights institutions in interacting with
country scale to explain differences in economic growth. It appears that a positive
(negative) scale effect exists over the long-run where property rights institutions
are poor (good). We have interpreted this relationship as reflecting the role that
property rights institutions play in determining market extent. The findings con-
tribute to the literature on the existence of a positive scale effect, as well as to that
which that stresses the potential costs of country size.
Clearly, the empirical methodology employed in this paper is open to criticism
in view of the potential endogeneity problems. However, given the robust role for
institutions found in many studies, even those conditioning on human capital and
trade, we have argued that the OLS results can be interpreted as strong evidence for
the existence of important interactions between scale and institutions. A number of
potential explanations of the results have been suggested, but much work remains
to understand the exact mechanisms through which institutions and scale interact.
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Appendix
A Learning By Doing and Extent of the Market
We first present in Subsection A.1 a simple model of learning by doing and tech-
nology spillovers from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), based upon models with
spillovers of Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986). In Subsection A.2 we extend that
model to account for market extent.
A.1 Learning By Doing and Complete Spillovers
A continuum of identical firms are indexed i ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm has a labour
augmenting technology and a standard neoclassical production function,
Yi = F (Ki, AiLi). (6)
We make two crucial assumptions about Ai: First, learning by doing works through
net investment so the level of technology is proportional to the capital stock; second,
firm knowledge is a public good, and spills over completely into the rest of the
economy. As such, we can replace Ai in equation (6) by a factor proportional to the
aggregate capital stock, K; so scale in this model is the aggregate stock of a factor
of production over the economy, not the total supply of labour in a specific research
sector as in the models after Romer (1990). Define ki = Ki/Li and note that in
equilibrium, ki = k for all i. Assuming the firm production function is homogeneous
of degree one, we can write average product of capital as, F (ki, K)/ki = f(L).
Then, the private marginal product of capital as F1(ki, K) = f(L)−Lf ′(L) < f(L),
which is increasing in L. Profit maximization by firms and a utility function with
constant elasticity of substitution θ and rate of time preference ρ yields the balanced
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path growth rate,
γ = θ−1 [f(L)− Lf ′(L)− ρ] . (7)
which is increasing in L, that is, there is a scale effect arising from learning by doing
and the assumption that firm-level technical progress is a public good.
A.2 Market Extent and Scale
Assume that technological spillovers can be limited to the ‘market’ in which a
firm competes, as Grilliches (1990) has noted. This market can be domestic and
international. Assume homogeneity of all firms, domestic and international, and,
for simplicity, zero tariffs incurred in international trade.11 Suppose that each firm
in the domestic economy, i ∈ [0, 1], can costlessly travel a distance Φ/2 ∈ R1+
in either direction to compete with neighboring firms. The parameter Φ is our
measure of market extent relative to the size of the domestic economy (empirically,
we will think of it as country specific, Φn where n indexes countries). Suppose that
all non-domestic firms are arranged in (−∞, 0) ∪ (1,+∞).12 So, if Φ > 1 then
all domestic firms are competing internationally, that is, there is some positive
openness on average. The market of a firm i is then comprised of firms in the
interval [i− Φ/2, i+ Φ/2], and the capital stock of firms in the market, Km, is,
Km =
∫
j∈[i−Φ/2,i+Φ/2]
Kjdj = ΦK (8)
Learning by doing still occurs within each firm, but now a firm’s technical progress
is proportional to the capital stock of the market, so Ai = Km. Suppose further that
11So the only distinction we make between the domestic and the international is in the definition
of country aggregates as the sum of domestic firms.
12Since there are no strategic interactions, we do not need to be specific about the arrangement
of non-domestic firms into countries. We only assume that the international firms comprise a
countable infinity of other countries, and that those firms lie in two path-connected sets (A, 0)
and (1, B) where A < 0, B > 1 and we require Φ/2 ≤ min{−A,B} for the second equality of (8)
to hold.
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an individual firm is not necessarily a negligible part of its market, so ∂Km
∂Ki
≥ 0.13
Since the spillovers are now partially internalized, the scale of Km determines the
rate of growth via learning by doing and the private marginal return to capital.
Now we have, where Lm = ΦL is the labour supply in the market,
γ =
c˙
c
= θ−1
[
f(Lm)−
(
Lm − ∂Km
∂ki
)
f ′(Lm)− ρ
]
.
From (8), we have that Km =
∫
j∈[i−Φ/2,i+Φ/2](kjLj)dj so,
γ = θ−1 [f(Lm)− (Lm − Li) f ′(Lm)− ρ] . (9)
We now have a direct connection between the size of a firm relative to its market
and the rate of growth. We still have a positive scale effect in Lm or, equivalently
Φ, since,
∂γ
∂Lm
= θ−1 [−(Lm − Li)f ′′(Lm)] . (10)
Equation (9) shows that scale is doing more than increase growth. Increasing scale
affects the distance between the decentralised growth rate and the social planner
growth rate. When Lm is relatively close to Li, learning by doing growth is small
but the decentralised growth rate is closer to that of the social planner because
more of the spillover is internalized. Nonetheless, (10) shows that increasing the
size of the market (Lm) holding the size of a firm (Li) constant means higher growth
because the learning by doing gain outweighs the larger spillover loss.
13So each firm comprises at least an atom in the mass of all firms. Despite this, we are neglecting
the potential implications for market structure; all firms remain perfectly competitive since the
‘market’ defines the extent of spillovers, and does not necessarily imply market power.
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Cobb-Douglas Production Function
Adopting a Cobb-Douglas production function, we can use data on population and
growth rates to back out implied values of Φ for each country. Specifically, assume
that output for a firm i in country n takes the following form,
Yi,n = A0(Ki,n)
α(ΦnKnLi,n)
1−α, (11)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and A0 > 0 is an exogenous technological parameter. The average
product of capital is,
yi,n
ki,n
= f(Ln) = A0(ΦnLn)
1−α, while the marginal product of
capital is,
∂F (ki,n,ΦKn)
∂ki,n
= A0
{
(ΦLn)
−α [αΦLn + (1− α)Li,n]
}
. (12)
So balanced growth in country n with exogenous Φn and country scale Ln is,
γn = θ
−1 [A0 {(ΦnLn)−α [αΦnLn + (1− α)Li,n]}− ρ] . (13)
In the formulation of equation (1), we take the conception of scale to be relative
(i.e., country labor supply is normalised by world labor supply) and we assume that
an individual firm is sufficiently small so that we have Li,n = 0.
B Empirical Results
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Table 3: Property Rights Institution I: Executive Constraint
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.14 0.24** 0.57** 0.54**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06)
log(inst)
-0.07 -0.34 -0.93** -0.80**
(0.43) (0.39) (0.38) (0.31)
log(scale)*inst
-0.04** -0.04** -0.06** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
log(govt share)
-0.69** -0.39**
(0.18) (0.14)
log(openness)
0.40** 0.64**
(0.15) (0.11)
log(xrat)
-0.15** -0.10**
(0.03) (0.02)
R2 0.25 0.45 0.47 0.66
Obs. 149 149 149 149
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.06 0.30 0.18 0.23
(0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21)
log(inst)
0.91 0.48 0.75 0.83
(0.97) (0.98) (0.99) (0.99)
log(scale)*inst
-0.0004 -0.01 0.0009 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log(govt share)
-0.06 0.16
(0.45) (0.46)
log(openness)
0.84** 0.80**
(0.37) (0.34)
log(xrat)
-0.05 -0.009
(0.07) (0.07)
R2 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.12
Obs. 149 149 149 149
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 4: Property Rights Institution II: Property Security
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.34** 0.34** 0.57** 0.52**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
log(inst)
-0.05 -0.31 -0.38 -0.52
(0.49) (0.45) (0.53) (0.47)
log(scale)*inst
-0.10** -0.09** -0.11** -0.08**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
log(govt share)
-0.42** -0.24*
(0.17) (0.15)
log(openness)
0.15 0.42**
(0.14) (0.12)
log(xrat)
-0.12** -0.10**
(0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.67
Obs. 130 130 130 130
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.81** 1.03** 0.80** 0.82**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
log(inst)
-1.52 -2.00** -2.11* -2.02*
(0.95) (0.94) (1.14) (1.12)
log(scale)*inst
-0.16** -0.17** -0.16** -0.13**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
log(govt share)
0.25 0.31
(0.34) (0.35)
log(openness)
0.94** 0.70**
(0.29) (0.28)
log(xrat)
-0.02 0.03
(0.06) (0.05)
R2 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.22
Obs. 130 130 130 130
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 5: Property Rights Institution III: Expropriation Protection
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.42** 0.37** 0.67** 0.63**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
log(inst)
0.32 0.19 -0.46 -0.78
(0.80) (0.74) (0.88) (0.79)
log(scale)*inst
-0.07** -0.06** -0.07** -0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log(govt share)
-0.40** -0.25
(0.17) (0.16)
log(openness)
-0.13** 0.28**
(0.15) (0.14)
log(xrat)
-0.13** -0.11**
(0.03) (0.02)
R2 0.53 0.63 0.58 0.68
Obs. 116 116 116 116
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.80** 1.08** 0.92** 0.96**
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34)
log(inst)
0.07 -1.11 -1.62 -1.86
(1.71) (1.72) (1.96) (1.92)
log(scale)*inst
-0.07 -0.08* -0.08* -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
log(govt share)
0.17 0.32
(0.40) (0.40)
log(openness)
1.01** 0.94**
(0.35) (0.34)
log(xrat)
-0.002 0.06
(0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.30
Obs. 116 116 116 116
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 6: Property Rights Institution IV: Repudiation
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.14 -0.02 0.44** 0.35**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
log(inst)
1.83** 2.28** 0.67 0.92
(0.71) (0.65) (0.84) (0.81)
log(scale)*inst
-0.03* -0.02 -0.06** -0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log(govt share)
-0.37** -0.24
(0.16) (0.17)
log(openness)
-0.34** -0.01
(0.13) (0.14)
log(xrat)
-0.09** -0.09
(0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.73 0.80 0.74 0.79
Obs. 87 87 87 87
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.44 0.76* 0.99** 1.28**
(0.36) (0.38) (0.40) (0.40)
log(inst)
1.06 -0.04 -2.47 -3.86*
(1.94) (1.97) (2.29) (2.28)
log(scale)*inst
-0.05 -0.06 -0.12** -0.13**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
log(govt share)
0.41 0.60
(0.49) (0.48)
log(openness)
0.89* 1.06**
(0.39) (0.39)
log(xrat)
-0.06 -0.009
(0.07) (0.06)
R2 0.25 0.30 0.29 0.36
Obs. 87 87 87 87
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
29
Table 7: Property Rights Institution V: Corruption
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.05 0.07 0.39** 0.38**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
log(inst)
0.34 0.42 0.16 0.06
(0.30) (0.27) (0.34) (0.28)
log(scale)*inst
-0.03** -0.02** -0.03** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(govt share)
-0.66** -0.38**
(0.20) (0.18)
log(openness)
0.21 0.58**
(0.15) (0.12)
log(xrat)
-0.15** -0.12**
(10.03) (0.02)
R2 0.32 0.51 0.40 0.63
Obs. 121 121 121 121
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.30* 0.60** 0.34** 0.53**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
log(inst)
1.36** 0.93* 1.12** 0.67
(0.56) (0.54) (0.65) (0.63)
log(scale)*inst
-0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log(govt share)
0.11 0.46
(0.40) (0.40)
log(openness)
1.28** 1.10**
(0.31) (0.28)
log(xrat)
-0.02 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.19 0.30 0.24 0.33
Obs. 121 121 121 121
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 8: Contracting Institution I: Formalism
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
-0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.20*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11)
log(inst)
-1.51 -0.70 -0.83 0.04
(0.94) (0.88) (0.79) (0.66)
log(scale)*inst
-0.03 -0.01 0.006 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
log(govt share)
-0.51** -0.22
(0.23) (0.21)
log(openness)
0.27 0.77**
(0.19) (0.15)
log(xrat)
-0.16** -0.14**
(0.03) (-0.03)
R2 0.16 0.34 0.18 0.49
Obs. 111 111 111 111
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
-0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.04
(0.27) (0.27) (0.23) (0.24)
log(inst)
0.02 0.79 0.43 0.96
(1.64) (1.65) (1.38) (1.42)
log(scale)*inst
0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
log(govt share)
0.002 0.11
(0.44) (0.45)
log(openness)
1.08** 0.97**
(0.36) (0.33)
log(xrat)
-0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.14
Obs. 111 111 111 111
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 9: Contracting Institution II: Number of Procedures
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
-0.01 0.10 0.44** 0.56**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08)
log(inst)
-1.78** -1.16 -0.40 -0.92*
(0.82) (0.70) (0.62) (0.48)
log(scale)*inst
-0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
log(govt share)
-0.57** -0.22
(0.20) (0.15)
log(openness)
0.44** 0.82**
(0.18) (0.12)
log(xrat)
-0.18** -0.12**
(0.03) (0.02)
R2 0.12 0.40 0.38 0.66
Obs. 121 121 121 121
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.17 0.62** 0.09 0.31
(0.24) (-2.09) (0.19) (0.21)
log(inst)
-1.81 1.42 0.02 -0.69
(1.45) (-0.006) (1.29) (1.29)
log(scale)*inst
-0.002 -0.007 0.006 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
log(govt share)
-0.09 0.02
(0.41) (0.42)
log(openness)
1.30** 0.96**
(0.37) (0.33)
log(xrat)
-0.07 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.10 0.21 0.14 0.20
Obs. 121 121 121 121
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 10: Contracting Institution III: Procedural Complexity
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.07 0.26 0.51** 0.51**
(0.28) (0.25) (0.17) (0.13)
log(inst)
-1.99 -1.57 -1.06 -0.70
(1.66) (1.41) (1.05) (0.81)
log(scale)*inst
-0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
log(govt share)
-0.54** -0.27*
(0.21) (0.0.16)
log(openness)
0.55** 0.75**
(0.18) (0.12)
log(xrat)
-0.19** -0.12**
(0.03) (0.02)
R2 0.07 0.37 0.39 0.0.65
Obs. 121 121 121 121
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
-0.06 0.54 0.28 0.43
(0.51) (0.50) (0.36) (0.36)
log(inst)
0.94 -0.13 0.05 -0.12
(2.97) (2.83) (2.26) (2.19)
log(scale)*inst
0.05 0.005 0.01 -0.000
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
log(govt share)
-0.14 0.09
(0.42) (0.42)
log(openness)
1.42** 1.08**
(0.36) (0.32)
log(xrat)
-0.10 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.18
Obs. 121 121 121 121
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 11: Contracting Institution IV: Debt Efficiency
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.14** 0.07 0.28** 0.27**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
log(inst)
-0.04 0.06 0.11 0.11
(0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28)
log(scale)*inst
-0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(govt share)
-0.50** -0.36*
(0.19) (0.18)
log(openness)
-0.11 0.21
(0.14) (0.13)
log(xrat)
-0.02** -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.37 0.43 0.45 0.50
Obs. 85 85 85 85
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.32 0.42* 0.34 0.34
(0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23)
log(inst)
0.13 0.46 -0.48 -0.11
(0.80) (0.84) (0.84) (0.89)
log(scale)*inst
-0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
log(govt share)
0.01 -0.02
(0.56) (0.57)
log(openness)
0.79* 0.46
(0.41) (0.41)
log(xrat)
0.09 0.10
(0.08) (0.08)
R2 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.20
Obs. 85 85 85 85
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 12: Contracting Institution V: Debt Cost
Panel A: Dep. var. = Log real GDP per capita
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.02 0.01 0.21 0.25**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
log(inst)
-0.49** -0.38** -0.44 -0.34**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14)
log(scale)*inst
-0.20 -0.16 -0.19 -0.14
(0.25) (0.23) (0.21) (0.20)
log(govt share)
-0.62** -0.34*
(0.20) (0.19)
log(openness)
0.05 0.35**
(0.15) (0.13)
log(xrat)
-0.06 -0.06**
(0.03) (0.02)
R2 0.19 0.0.31 0.33 0.46
Obs. 85 85 85 85
Panel B: Dep. var. = GDP per capita growth
Scale = Pop Scale = GDP
log(scale)
0.002 0.21 0.02 0.14
(0.18) (0.21) (0.16) (0.18)
log(inst)
0.06 0.14 -0.02 0.14
(0.47) (0.47) (0.44) (0.44)
log(scale)*inst
0.47 0.54 0.30 0.44
(0.68) (0.67) (0.65) (0.64)
log(govt share)
-0.43 -0.37
(0.58) (0.61)
log(openness)
1.06** 0.93**
(0.43) (0.41)
log(xrat)
-0.007 0.009
(0.08) (0.08)
R2 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.08
Obs. 85 85 85 85
N.B. ** and * denote significance at 5 and 10% respectively. All
regressions include an unreported constant term. Variable descrip-
tions and data sources are given in the Appendix (Table 13). Pop
is country population as a proportion of world population; GDP is
country real GDP as a proportion of world real GDP.
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Table 13: List of Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
Expropriation
protection
A score of the risk of expropriation of a private foreign
investments, between 0 (highest risk) and 10 (lowest risk)
Used in Knack and
Keefer (1995), data from
International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG).
Repudiation The modification of a contract (repudiation, postponement
or scaling down) due to government pressure. Scored 0-10,
with lower scores for higher risks, averaged over 1982-95.
Knack and Keefer
(1995), using data from
ICRG.
Private property A score indicating the extent of protection of private prop-
erty from 1(very low) to 5 (very high)
Gwartney and Lawson
(1997)
Corruption An score from 0 to 10 of corruption in government, where
lower scores indicate higher likelihood of a bureaucrat
to demand illegal payments in relation to trade licenses,
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or
loans.
La Porta et al. (1999)
Legal formalism An updated version of the legal formalism index, indicat-
ing the formality of legal procedures for collecting on a
bounced cheque
Djankov et al. (2003)
Number of pro-
cedures
Number of procedures involved in collecting a commercial
debt of 50% of per capita income
World Bank (2004)
Procedural com-
plexity
Index of the procedural complexity involved in collecting
a commercial debt of 50% of per capita income (on a scale
from 0 to 10 as in AJ)
World Bank (2004)
Openness 1985-2004 average of exports plus imports as a ratio of
GDP in constant (2000) prices. Deleted countries with
fewer than 10 growth observations for the period (An-
gola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan,
Libya, Seychelles).
Heston et al. (2006)
Growth 1985-2004 average of growth rate of real GDP per capita.
Same deleted countries.
Heston et al. (2006)
Exchange rate 1985-2004 average of exchange rate relative to US. Same
deleted countries.
Heston et al. (2006)
GDP per capita 1985-2004 averages of real (2000 prices) GDP per capita.
Same deleted countries as above.
Heston et al. (2006)
Level of GDP Authors calculations using 1985-2004 averages of real (2000
prices) GDP per capita and population. Same deleted
countries as above.
Heston et al. (2006)
Population 1985-2004 average population. Same deleted countries. Heston et al. (2006)
Government
share of GDP
1985-2004 average government spending share of real (2000
prices) GDP per capita Same deleted countries.
Heston et al. (2006)
Executive con-
straints
1985-2004 average for constraint on executive. Treating
flags for interregnums, transitions and foreign ‘interrup-
tions’ as missing values
Polity IV (2006)
Debt Efficiency The present value of the net worth of Mirage using data
for the cost, time to resolution and the rate of interest on
private debt in each country
Djankov et al. (2008)
Debt Cost The estimated cost of the insolvency proceeding for Mi-
rage, reported as a percentage of the value of the insol-
vency estate, borne by all parties
Djankov et al. (2008)
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